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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 1982, Mexico declared that it could not meet its debt-
servicing obligations. After that announcement, Brazil and some other 
debtor countries followed Mexico, declaring that they also were unable to 
meet their debt obligations. 
Since then, world financial institutions have realized that they are 
faced with one of the most difficult situations of their history. 
Countries which have received hundreds of billions of dollars as loans 
from western banks and financial institutions are declaring, one after 
another, that they cannot pay the interest and amortization of their 
debts. For example, according to World Bank data, in 1981 alone 13 
countries asked for reschedulings of theii debts (World Bank, 1985, 
p. 4), In 1983, 31 cases of reschedulings of debts involving 21 
countries were recorded (World Bank, 1985, p. 110).^ In 1984, another 31 
cases of rescheduling of debts were recorded (World Bank, 1985). 
In order to have a better understanding of the problem, we will 
review a short history of the debt crisis of the less-developed 
countries. 
Throughout history, capital has flowed from richer to poorer 
countries. This is because capital is relatively scarce in poorer 
countries and the rate of return on capital is higher. In richer 
^During a fiscal year, a debtor country can reschedule its debt 
several times, depending upon the situation. Arrangements concluded with 
creditors in the same year are regarded as separate reschedulings. That 
is why the number of reschedulings, are greater than the number of debtor 
countries. 
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countries, which are in higher states of development, capital is 
relatively abundant; therefore, the rate of return on capital is lower. 
Foreign capital helps less-developed countries overcome their 
economic and financial problems. It has helped a lot of countries when 
they have faced financial difficulties, such as might occur because of a 
large decrease in the price of their exports. As a result of such a 
situation, they need funds to meet their external obligations and their 
internal economic plans and developments. Foreign capital has helped 
less-developed countries to make substantial economic and social 
progress. There is much evidence that capital flows to these countries 
have helped them to increase the standard of living and life e^ectancy 
of their people. At the same time, infant mortality has been halved and 
primary school enrollment rates have risen from 50 to 94 percent (World 
Bank, 1985) during the last two decades, i.e., 1960-82. The growth rate 
of GNP and GDP of less-developed countries averaged six percent per year 
from 1960-1980 (World Bank, 1985, p. 3). 
Considering the past years, we see that debt-servicing difficulties 
have been something normal and common but never as severe as in recent 
years. In the 19th century, several countries faced debt-servicing 
problems because of their domestic economic policies and external 
economic crises. For example, in the 1870s, the Turks and Peruvians had 
difficulties fulfilling their external debt obligations. In the 1880s 
and 1890s, the Argentineans and Brazilians had the same difficulties. 
The structure of financial flows to developing countries has changed 
several times through history. Before World War I, the main source of 
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capital was private bond markets. In the 1930s, following the Great 
Depression,.there were several defaults by borrowing countries, both 
industrial and developing countries. Because of that, commercial bank 
lending to developing countries stopped. After World War II, capital 
flows to less-developed countries occurred mainly through the official 
sector. The largest part was bilateral (governments and governmental 
agencies), but some was channeled through new institutions like the World 
Bank and the International Development Association. These channels, 
along with private direct investment and the supplying of credits, were 
the main source of credits and finance for less-developed countries until 
the late 1960s.^ After the 1960s, commercial banks started to play a 
prominent role in lending money to less-developed countries. 
We should notice that when creditors lend money to these less-
developed countries, they are ready to assume some risks related to these 
loans because less-developed countries may be faced with some internal 
and external economic and political difficulties. Therefore, what is new 
is the speed and severity of the crisis. 
Most scholars and experts of the world financial system believe that 
the developing countries' current debt problems probably began after the 
oil price increase of 1973. Data show that at the end of 1972, the 
external debt of developing countries was almost evenly divided between 
^There are three main sources of funds from which less-developed 
countries can borrow; official sources which are composed of governments 
and governmental agencies (also called bilateral lenders), international 
organizations (called multilateral^lenders), and private sources which 
consist of commercial banks and private investors who invest in less-
developed countries. 
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official and private creditors. At the end of 1972, non-oil developing 
countries^ owed 45 percent of their external debt to the official sector 
and 54 percent to the private sector (Claudon, 1986, p. 12). After the 
first oil price shock in 1973, non-oil developing countries needed more 
money to finance their current account deficits, so they tried to find 
new sources of funding to overcome their deficit problems. They turned 
to private creditors, which were mainly banks. As a result of that, the 
external debt of these developing countries to the private sector 
increased from 54 percent in 1972 to 62 percent in 1984 (Claudon, 1986). 
By the end of 1984, the commercial banks' share of the total publicly 
2 guaranteed medium and long-term debt owed by nonoil developing countries 
amounted to 86 percent (Claudon, 1986, p. 12). So, overall it is clear 
that the banks' share of the debt owed by the less-developed countries 
has increased dramatically. Because of that, they became more involved 
with the economic and political situations in these countries. 
Commercial banks became more vulnerable to the risks of debt-servicing 
problems and defaults of less-developed countries. After the oil price 
shock, thô number of defaults increased. In 1975, 15 countries had 
difficulty servicing their external debts, and by the end of 1981, more 
than 32 countries were experiencing the same difficulty (Claudon, 1986, 
p. 12). These countries were unable to fulfill their external debt 
^Oil exporting countries are defined by the IMF as those developing 
countries whose oil exports equal at least 100 million barrels per year. 
All other developing countries are called non-oil developing countries. 
Publicly guaranteed debts are external obligations of private 
debtors that are guaranteed for repayment by a public entity of the 
debtor country. 
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responsibilities. As Table 1.1 (Claudon, 1986, p. 24) shows, the 
external debt of non-oil developing countries has increased from 130.1 
billion dollars in 1973 to 711 billion dollars in 1984. 
Table 1.1. External debt of non-oil developing countries from 1973 to 
1984 (in billions of dollars) (Claudon, 1985, p. 24) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
130.1 160.8 190.8 228.0 280.3 334.3 395.3 475.2 559.6 633.3 668.5 710.9 
We see that in nominal terms, the debt of 142 non-oil developing 
countries increased approximately 5.5 times from 1973 to 1984. If we add 
to that number the debt owed by the five OPEC countries that are not in 
capital surplus (Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela), 
the total debt of developing countries reached 812 billion dollars in 
1984. 
The current situation is very fragile. By the end of 1985, the 15 
largest less-developed countries have 520 billion dollars in external 
debts and interest payments. They have to pay 55 billion dollars 
annually for the principal and interest on their external loans. The 
three largest debtors of developing countries to the U.S. banks are 
Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. These three countries alone owe 
U.S. banks something around 52.4 billion dollars. 
6 
We have to consider that because of the high volume of debt of 
borrowing countries and the large size of interest of these loans, 
western banks and other creditors reduced loans to these countries. This 
restriction imposed extreme financing constraints on the non-oil 
developing countries which needed new loans in order to meet their 
debt-servicing. Reduction of new loans to less-developed countries by 
financial institutions made many less-developed countries unable to meet 
their external debt obligations. So by the end of 1984, an increasing 
number of less-developed countries sought to reschedule their external 
debt payments. During 1983, about 30 countries completed or were trying 
to reschedule their debts. These 30 countries owed more than half of the 
external debt of all developing countries. Data show that for early 
1985, the external debt of developing countries was 812 billion dollars 
and annual debt service payments were 122 billion dollars (Claudon, 
1985, p. 14). 
Much of the developing countries' debt is owed by a few countries. 
For example, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Korea, and Indonesia—the five 
largest debtor countries—owe more than 30 percent of the total debt of 
the developing countries (Claudon, 1986). It is interesting to see that 
the exposure^ of banks to these countries increased very rapidly; it more 
than tripled from December 1978-December 1982. In 1982, U.S. banks' 
total lending to developing countries was about 37 percent of total bank 
lending to these countries. 
^Exposure of a bank means the ratio of the bank's loans to 
less-developed countries to its capital. This ratio is multiplied by 100 
to be presented as a percentage. 
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If we look at Table 1.2 (Claudon, 1986, p. 41) we realize that, 
relative to capital, exposure of U.S. banks to East European and non-oil 
developing countries increased from 132 percent in 1977 to 155 percent in 
1982. This ratio for the nine largest U.S. banks was 188.2 percent in 
1977 and increased to 235.1 percent in 1982. Over 60 percent of lending 
to developing countries was done by these nine largest U.S. banks in 
1982. 
Table 1.2." Exposure of U.S. banks to non-oil developing countries and 
eastern Europe, relative to capital, 1977-82 (percent end of 
year) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
All U.S. banks 
Non-oil developing countries 114.9 114.4 124,2 132.3 148.3 146.1 
Mexico 27.4 23.4 23.0 27.6 34.3 34.5 
Brazil 29.4 28.6 27.3 25.4 26.9 28.9 
Eastern Europe 16.7 15.8 16.1 13.9 12.9 8.9 
Nine largest U.S. banks 
Non-oil developing countries 163.2 166.8 182.1 199.3 220.6 221.2 
Mexico 32.9 30.4 29.6 37.8 44.4 44.4 
Brazil 41.9 42.4 40.3 39.3 40.8 45.8 
Eastern Europe 25.0 23.5 23.9 21.8 19.5 13.9 
We also can consider some ratios like: ratio of debt to GNP, ratio 
of debt to exports, debt service ratio,^ and ratio of interest service to 
^Debt service ratio is defined as the ratio of total debt services 
to exports of goods and services. 
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GNP of the developing countries. These ratios for selected years between 
1970 and 1984 show the overall situation of the less-developed countries 
in terras of their debt. The data for these ratios are listed in 
Table 1.3 (World Bank, 1985, p. 24).^ 
Table 1.3. Debt indicators for developing countries in selected years, 
1970-1984 (percent end of year) 
All developing 
countries 1970 1974 1976 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Ratio of debt to 
GNP 14.1 15.4 18.1 21.0 20.9 22.4 26.3 31.3 33.8 
Ratio of debt to 
exports 108.9 80.0 100.2 113.1 89.8 96.8 115.0 130.8 135.4 
Debt service 
ratio^ 14.7 11.8 13.6 18.4 16.0 17.6 20.5 19.0 19.7 
Ratio of interest^ 
service to GNP .5 .8 .8 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.8 
^Debt service ratio is the ratio of total debt services to exports 
of goods and services. 
^Ratio of interest service to GNP is the ratio of interest payments 
(excluding the repayments of principal on external debt) on external debt 
to GNP. 
The above data show that all of the ratios have increased from 1970 
to 1984. This trend indicates that, in general, less-developed countries 
^Interest and debt service for 1970-83 are actual (not contractual) 
service paid during the period. 
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are facing more difficulties meeting their debt-servicing and payments. 
For example, the ratio of debt to exports provides a rough estimate of 
the countries' financial difficulties. If this ratio is high, it means 
that a large portion of export earning goes toward the servicing of 
foreign debts. A rising ratio of debt to GNP also indicates that a 
rising portion of the nation's output is likely to be needed to service 
debt. 
Exposures of the Large Banks to the Risk of 
Defaults by Less-Developed Countries 
The relationship between commercial banka and developing countries 
has been transformed in the past 15 years. As mentioned earlier, before 
1970, bank lending to developing countries was relatively small. After 
1970, banks slowly became a major source of foreign funds for developing 
countries. Therefore, banks became more vulnerable to debt-servicing 
problems of the less-developed countries. Consider the following data in 
Table 1.4 which show the exposure of the 18 largest U.S. banks at the end 
of 1982 to five Latin American countries that had debt-servicing 
difficulties (Cline, 1984, p. 24). 
Table 1.4 shows that the U.S. banking system as a whole and these 18 
largest banks in particular are potentially very vulnerable to the debt 
crisis of the developing countries. 
To see the situation better, consider Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. 
If these three countries do not service their debts completely for one 
year, it will cause cash-flow declines equal to 47 percent of the capital 
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Table 1.4. Exposure as a percentage of capital, major banks, end-1982 
(Cline, 1984, p. 24) 
Bank Argentina Brazil Mexico Venezuela Chile Total Capital^ 
Citibank 
Bank of 
America 
18.2 
10.2 
73.5 
47.9 
54.6 
52.1 
18.2 
41.7 
10.0 
6.3 
174.5 
158.2 
5989 
4799 
Chase 
Manhattan 
Morgan 
Guaranty 
21.3 
24.4 
56.9 
54.3 
40.0 
34.8 
24.0 
17.5 
11.8 
9.7 
154.0 
140.7 
4221 
3107 
Manufacturers 
Hanover 
Chemical 
47.5 
14.9 
77.7 
52.0 
66.7 
60.0 
42.4 
28.0 
28.4 
14.8 
262.8 
169.7 
2592 
2499 
Continental 
Illinois 
Bankers Trust 
17.8 
13.2 
22.9 
46.2 
32.4 
46.2 
21.6 
25.1 
12.8 
10.6 
107.5 
141.2 
2143 
1895 
First Nat'l 
Chicago 
Security 
Pacific 
14.5 
10.4 
40.6 
29.1 
50.1 
31.2 
17.4 
4.5 
11.6 
7.4 
134.2 
82.5 
1725 
1684 
Wells Fargo 
Crocker 
Nat'l 
8.3 
38.1 
40.7 
57.3 
51.0 
51.2 
20.4 
22.8 
6.2 
26.5 
126.6 
196.0 
1201 
1151 
First 
Interstate 
Marine 
Midland 
6.9 
n.a.^ 
43.9 
47.8 
63.0 
28.3 
18.5 
29.2 
3.7 
n.a. 
136.0 
n.a. 
1080 
1074 
Mellon 
Irving Trust 
n.a. 
21.6 
35.3 
38.7 
41.1 
34.1 
17.6 
50.2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1024 
996 
First Nat'l 
Boston 
Interfirst 
Dallas 
n.a. 
5.1 
23.1 
10.2 
28.1 
30.1 
n.a. 
1.3 
n.a. 
2.5 
n.a. 
49.2 
800 
787 
^Capital in million dollars. 
^Not available. 
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of the nine U.S. largest banks. Data show that in 1983, for example, 
Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil owed 31.3 billion dollars to the nine 
largest banks whose capital is only 29 billion dollars. In addition, 
these three countries owed about 3.4 billion dollars in interest and 6.9 
billion dollars in short-term debt payments as well as 3.4 billion 
dollars in long-term debt payments; so in 1983, these three countries 
together owed about 13.7 billion dollars of debt-service payments to the 
nine largest banks. In 1983, the capital of these banks totaled about 
29.0 billion dollars, so a cash flow decline of 13.7 billion dollars 
would equal 47 percent of the combined capital for these nine largest 
banks (Cline, 1984, p. 27). 
Purpose of the Dissertation 
The description of the world debt situation shows that the issue is 
very urgent and serious. Economists and experts on the issue have 
conducted a lot of studies about it. 
In Chapter II, I will review the most important literature on the 
world debt crisis. In the current literature about the LDCs' debt 
problems, authors assume (or at least they guess) that there are some 
relationships between the economic ratios (indicators such as the ratio 
of debt to GNP or the ratio of debt to exports, etc.) of the debtor 
countries and the rescheduling by them of debts. For example, they 
mention frequently that a particular debtor country has been forced to 
reschedule its debt servicing because its ratio of debt to exports was 
high (see Claudon, 1986, p. 48) and so on. Therefore, in this study I 
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try to clarify this point and find out whether or not in fact there are 
such relationships between the economic ratios of the debtor countries 
and the probability of default by them. I will take some of the most 
important (as well as those mentioned in the literature) economic ratios 
of the debtor countries (as long as available data permit) and use a 
probit probability model to study the subject. Therefore, the 
independent variables will be the economic ratios of the debtor countries 
and the dependent variable will be the probability of default by them. 
In Chapter III, I will review the probit probability technique as 
well as my own study concerning the world debt crisis in detail. 
In Chapter IV, I will discuss the data and I will report the 
econometric results of this study. 
Chapter V summarizes the dissertation and offers some conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Since the outbreak of the international debt crisis, many papers and 
books have been published on the subject. Economists, experts in inter­
national finance, and employees of international financial institutions 
like the IMF and the World Bank have studied the international debt 
crisis very carefully. After studying and analyzing the problem, they 
have come up with some conclusions and solutions to the problem. These 
studies have been documented in different books and journals. 
In this chapter, I will review some of the most important and 
relevant studies about the international debt problem. 
Literary Discussions 
Kristin Halberg 
Kristin Halberg (Assistant Professor of Economics at Colby College 
and an expert in international trade and finance) believes that there are 
three causes of the debt problems of the less-developed countries. These 
causes are; external economic shocks, internal LDCs' (less-developed 
countries) economic policy, and western banks' loan policies. As 
external economic shocks Kristin Halberg considers industrial countries' 
monetary, fiscal, trade, and regulatory policies. Kristin Halberg argues 
that industrial countries responded to the first oil-price shock by 
choosing an expansionary monetary policy, which, together with the oil-
price increase, caused a large increase in inflation rates (Halberg, 
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1986, p. 10). So average annual inflation rates increased from 4.7 
percent during the years 1963-72 to above ten percent in 1974-75. Real 
interest rates (measured as Eurodollar rates minus the rate of increase 
in the U.S. producer price index) fell to an average -0.8 percent for 
1971-80; real interest rates were negative on average for the decade 
(IMF, 1982). Since the cost of borrowing was very low, LDCs increased 
their borrowing from abroad to avoid rapid adjustment due to the external 
shocks which could damage their development plans. On the other hand, 
when the second oil-price shock happened, industrial countries responded 
to that by choosing different economic policies. Governments of the 
industrial countries adopted tight monetary policies in order to fight 
against inflation. This tight monetary policy, together with high 
inflationary expectations, raised real interest rates to almost ten 
percent in 1981. High real interest rates put a lot of pressure on LDCs 
to meet their debt obligations. Therefore, Kristin Halberg blames the 
industrial countries' monetary policies, especially the U.S. monetary 
policy, as an external cause of the LDCs' debt servicing problems. 
(Halberg, 1986, p. 11). 
Halberg also considers the trade policies of the industrial 
countries as another external cause of the current LDCs' debt problems. 
High unemployment rates in the industrial countries in the early 1980s 
led to protectionist pressures (quantitative restrictions and voluntary 
export restrictions on LDCs' exports) that made it more difficult for 
LDCs to export to markets of the industrial countries (Halberg, 1986, 
p. 11). Halberg mentions internal domestic demand pressures in the LDCs 
15 
as internal LDCs' economic policies (economic policies which are designed 
to satisfy the domestic demand), which contributed to their payments 
problems. In non-oil LDCs, according to Halberg, excess domestic demand 
in the 1970s and early 1980s is usually attributed to expansionary 
government expenditure that led to fiscal deficits and overvalued real 
exchange rates. These fiscal deficits caused high inflation rates in 
most non-oil LDCs. Therefore, fiscal deficits, domestic demand 
pressures, inflation, and overvalued real exchange rates all together 
caused the deterioration of the current-account balances of the LDCs 
(Halberg, 1986, p. 11). 
Also, LDCs should be blamed because they used borrowed money for 
consumption, financing private capital outflows, and acquisition of 
foreign assets rather than domestic investment. Halberg believes that 
western banks' loan policies have also contributed to the debt problems 
of the UDCs. Banks reduced their loans to LDCs perceiving that those 
countries cannot adjust to the deterioration in the world economy. Also, 
banks became more cautious about the risks involving loans to LDCs. 
Banks, instead of increasing risk premium on loans to LDCs, reduced the 
amount of new loans to LDCs. Reduction in banks lending to LDCs, 
coincident with the increase in interest rates and declining export 
earnings, caused a big increase in the number of countries experiencing 
debt servicing difficulties. 
Barend A. de Vries 
Barend A. de Vries (past Senior Adviser and Chief Economist at the 
World Bank) examines the debt problems of the LDCs and comes to the 
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conclusion that the behavior of the international commercial banks and 
their smaller regional and local agencies is the key. They play a 
critical, if not dominant, role in any future loans because these banks 
lend money to. LDCs without considering how well the money has been used 
to benefit the economies of the LDCs. These kinds of policies are wrong 
and banks should correct their loan policies. In the past, banks did not 
apply internal measures to assure that their loans were well used. They 
did not apply any measure to stop the loans which could not benefit the 
LDCs' economies (de Vries, 1986, p. 64). There are some loans to the 
LDCs that have been used for the wrong purposes, such as financing 
capital flight or unrecorded imports of military equipment. Also, before 
lending money to these developing countries, banks should study the 
economic policies of the borrower countries, country-by-country. 
de Vries argues that usually countries that suffer debt servicing 
problems adopt economic policies which lead to an appreciation in the 
real exchange rate, a high debt-exports ratio, high inflation, excessive 
public sector deficits, overextended state enterprises, and price 
controls or subsidization or both. These economic policies most of the 
time discourage the coordination of external credits and the channeling 
of capital to investments with high economic yields (de Vries, 1985, 
p. 65). 
de Vries believes that there should be some internal structural 
adjustments in LDCs in order to make them able to meet external shocks. 
These internal structural adjustments include; 
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a. keeping the exchange rate abreast of inflation, 
b. liberalizing import regulations in line with the objectives of 
greater industrial efficiency, 
c. helping export industries by further removing the biases against 
them in the incentive system and strengthening their ability to 
invest and modernize, 
d. improving public sector management through the economic evalua­
tion of key investments, programming, macroeconomic modeling and 
improving the data base, completing public sector projects with 
high economic returns, for example, in the steel and electric 
power industries, and 
e. rationalizing domestic credit markets and strengthening the 
private industrial sector. 
If the LDCs can make the above internal adjustments then they will be 
able to resist external shocks and improve their debt service difficul­
ties (de Vries, 1986, p. 68). 
Irving S. Friedman 
Irving S. Friedman (an expert in international finance with 
experience in the IMF, World Bank, Citibank, and First Boston Corpora­
tion) believes that some LDCs need a net inflow of resources over a long 
period of time. They need this net inflow of funds even to maintain 
existing standards of living, given the large rate of growth in their 
population and the urbanization of all these LDCs. It is not a sign of 
economic weakness for a country to be in external debt in order to 
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finance its development plans from capital inflows as well as domestic 
savings. LDCs can even finance their investments with funds borrowed on 
commercial terms. If the country is well-managed economically and 
remains creditworthy, it can continue to borrow and ease the burden of 
repayments (Friedman, 1983, p. 77). But, structural changes in the 
international economy, including the repeated increases in the price of 
oil, global inflation and a long period of low rate of growth of 
economies in the developed countries have an adverse impact on LDCs 
because both the volume and price of commodity exports from the third 
world have decreased and that has created acute problems for many LDCs. 
The governments of these LDCs should adjust their development patterns 
and economic structures to the substantial changes in the international 
economic environment. One of the economic policies that borrowing 
countries should follow is the policy that makes them able to export 
goods and services to creditor countries, either directly or indirectly, 
in order to obtain the surpluses in foreign exchange needed to pay 
amortization and interest. Also, there is always the possibility that 
the externally borrowed funds are financing consumption rather than 
strengthening the productive capacity of the borrowing country (Friedman, 
1983, p. 85). This policy of increasing consumption through borrowing 
can reduce domestic savings, decrease exports, increase imports, reduce 
investment in domestic production and as a result of that the balance of 
payments deficit will increase. 
When western banks make loans to LDCs, they have to realize that 
there is a risk involved. Friedman believes that the risk in inter-
19 
national lending by private banks or by any private investors cannot be 
eliminated. But, risk can be managed in such a way that it can increase 
the power of the private banks that do international lending. Lending 
overseas is a potential source of strength for the banks and not a source 
of weakness. The important point is the anticipation of changes. The 
key is being able to react quickly to changes in the borrower countries 
and avoid excessive losses caused by failure to anticipate the changes. 
Banks should anticipate the changes in the borrower LDCs and react in 
such a manner as to protect the bank from eventual loss, even in the case 
of disruption of debt servicing causing temporary losses (Friedman, 1983, 
p. 209). So far, among the major banks there has not been any standard 
system for evaluating risks and changes in the borrower LDCs. In most 
banks, country evaluation was undertaken at headquarters by the bank's 
line personnel without critical reviews by another group in the institu­
tion. Some banks use quantitative techniques in order to evaluate the 
risk of lending to a particular country. Then they use the results of 
that evaluation with some qualitative techniques to come to the conclu­
sion. Some banks use either a letter or numerical rating to summarize 
the results from the country evaluation system in setting maximum 
exposure limits (Friedman, 1983). 
Friedman believes that as far as the calculation of the risk of 
lending to LDCs is concerned, in general there exist three basic country 
evaluation systems. These three systems are commonly used by commercial 
banks and may be categorized as follows. 
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The first system of evaluation of the risk of lending to LDCs is the 
Delphi/expert opinion (Friedman, 1983, p. 212). The Delphi/expert 
opinion approach consists of a panel of experts who rate each country's 
performance based on a set of elements assumed to be influencing that 
country's future. Responses to those elements are weighed, aggregated, 
and compared. Next, a panel of experts comes to some conclusion about 
the risk of lending to that country. However, the information obtained 
using the Delphi method is too generalized to be significantly useful in 
making specific business decisions (Friedman, 1983). The Delphi/expert 
opinion approach has four specific drawbacks. 
a. It is difficult for private banks to give confidential business 
information to panels and relate business decision-making to 
panels. 
b. It is difficult to transform this into an approved method of 
continuous assessment of changing situations, so that this 
method is not well-designed for anticipating risk. 
c. It is difficult and costly to set up the panel of experts with 
the rich experience and knowledge which is required for high-
level professional opinion on the countries. 
d. It obscures responsibilities for country evaluations. 
The second method is quantitative/econometric, which focuses and 
transfers risk, or on the potential of a country having balance of 
payments difficulty. In this method, the first step is to identify 
countries with the potential balance of payments difficulties. They 
consider some of the economic variables that they think are very 
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important. Then they highlight and select those important economic 
variables and develop econometric models. According to these econometric 
models, they predict the balance of payments behaviors of these LDCs. 
Also, to assess a country's likely response to balance of payments 
difficulties, the results of the initial econometric models are often 
reviewed with qualitative data before judgments become final. The econo­
metric approach has its limitations in reliability and usefulness, even 
if expanded to include noneconomic factors, for the following reasons. 
a. For many countries, the needed reliable data for such methods 
are not available. 
b. Even if available, relevant historical experience is limited or 
can be misleading as a basis for anticipating the future. 
c. The predictive quality of such models has repeatedly proven 
weak. 
d. Facts used in country evaluations are restricted too narrowly in 
order to fit methodology.^ For example, they do not include 
qualitative aspects which do not lend themselves to quantifica­
tion. 
e. The method underestimates the importance of policy responses to 
balance of payments difficulties (Friedman, 1983, p. 212). 
The third method of risk-evaluation of lending to LDCs is integrated and 
comprehensive in scope. This method has three distinct components. 
a. The likelihood of balance of payments difficulties (as with the 
quantitative/econometric approach). 
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b. Likely country responses to possible balance of payments 
difficulties. 
c. Outlook for risks other than payments and likely country 
responses where appropriate. 
Among the three country-risk evaluation systems mentioned above, the 
integrated and comprehensive approach is the most reliable one (Friedman, 
1983, p. 215). Because it includes all different quantitative and 
qualitative data and information, it considers the accumulated knowledge 
of bank officers and their experiences. This method also identifies 
banks' business interests and possible related country risks. This 
method aims to be comprehensive enough to cover all important and 
significant identifiable risk factors. It is integrated enough to reach 
the conclusions. This approach can be adjusted with the rest of the 
bank's activities (Friedman, 1983, p. 216). The notion of risk is a 
broad notion, so we have to choose a methodology which is broad and 
complicated. A bank must include all potential significant risks when it 
is doing country assessments and does not confine itself to those which 
have appeared in the past or in other countries or for other banks. It 
is important to anticipate the way changes in country conditions will 
occur and not just react to the current events. 
Leonard J. Santam 
Leonard J. Santam, one of the experts in international finance and 
debt problems of the LDCs, studied the debt situation of the LDCs. He 
came to the following conclusion. 
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Santani says that the U.S. and other major industrial countries 
should agree to remove their domestic imbalance between monetary and 
fiscal policies. One of the steps that these industrial countries should 
take is to pledge a maximum budget deficit as a percentage of their GNP 
(Santam, 1986, p. 99). This maximum budget deficit should be something 
like three or four percent of the GNP. At the same time, the monetary 
authorities of these countries should bring down the interest rates to 
the levels that will stimulate their economies. He says that the U.S. 
budget deficit is the key place to start because the U.S. is the biggest 
lender of funds to LDCs and U.S. banks are more involved in lending money 
to LDCs than any other industrial countries' banks. He says that the 
U.S. government should decrease its deficit by two means. The U.S. 
government should increase its receipts and reduce the growth in its 
spending. He argues that "a national sales tax on the receipts side used 
as a surcharge when the deficit exceeds certain targets and a ceiling on 
expenditures rather than a ceiling on debt is the best combination to 
start with" (Santam, 1986, p. 101). He believes that these actions will 
decrease the strength of the dollar, limit the size of debtor countries' 
interest payments, and allow debtor nations to keep their interest rates 
lower. These policies will help to stimulate the economies of the U.S. 
and the major debtor countries. LDCs will be able to increase their 
exports and meet their international interest and principal payments more 
easily. Also, commercial banks which have lent to these LDCs can get a 
steadier stream of payments and the risk of lending money to these 
countries can decrease, Santam again argues that industrial countries 
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and their central banks should follow such domestic economic policies 
that reduce the possibility of recessions. He argues that the key factor 
should be reducing economic adversity and economic variability, because 
what really hurts the debtor countries is economic fluctuations in the 
industrial countries. When the debtor countries want to control infla­
tion and have a steady growth in their exports, they need stable outside 
economies. It is very difficult for these debtor countries to accomplish 
their economic plans when their economies fluctuate in a substantial way 
due to outside forces that are beyond their control. The point is that 
if there is a predictable stable economy in the industrial countries, 
that will reduce the outside shocks for the LDCs which are under debt. 
Therefore, they get the chance to work on their domestic economic 
problems and try to find a solution for the domestic problems. 
Considering the roles of the IMF and the World Bank as the two principal 
lenders to LDCs, he argues that the IMF, instead of telling debtor 
countries what kind of economic goals they must achieve, should base its 
assistance on whether the debtor countries have paid their debts on time 
or not. Most of the time, he says, the economic goals that the IMF 
suggests to the LDCs do not have political and social practicality. 
Santam says that the World Bank should increase its role as an investor 
in LDCs or as a lender to LDCs, because the World Bank has more 
flexibility than the IMF in terras of financial capabilities and access to 
funds. 
Santam reviews the financial institutions of the U.S. (as the 
biggest industrial country) and the roles that these institutions can 
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play to solve the debt problems of the LDCs. He comes to the conclusion 
that the Federal Reserve should allow commercial banks to borrow under 
the "extended credit" category at a rate below the market rate in order 
to make additional funds available to major debtor countries, but only if 
the banks set up larger loan-loss reserves (Santam, 1986, p. 103). He 
continues that when new loans are given to LDCs by the commercial banks, 
the debtor countries should have the option of making their payments with 
dollars, marks, or yen. At the same time, central banks should set up a 
pool of funds that will compensate the commercial banks' losses in case 
of the foreign exchange losses because of these kinds of loans. Commer­
cial banks should not make new loans to these LDCs which just allow them 
to pay the interest on the old loans, because such an approach allows 
major debtor countries to borrow additional funds often without attacking 
their basic problems (Santam, 1986, p. 106). At the end, Santam suggests 
that the governments of the industrial countries should take more active 
roles in lending to LDCs. The justification for this view is that a high 
number of bank problems and failures because of the loans to LDCs lead to 
a lot of economic difficulties in the industrial countries, and the 
problem is so large that only the governments of these industrial 
countries can solve the problem. Also, many of the major debtor 
countries are political and military allies of the industrial countries. 
William Parity, Jr. 
In another study, William Darity, Jr., develops the notion of 
"pushing" loans on the LDCs by commercial banks. Darity says that 
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pushing loans does not mean that bankers force LDC officials to accept 
loans. Pushing loans involves very soft terras relative to the 
expectations of the borrowers. Commercial banks, in an effort to dispose 
of their surplus funds, reduce the difference between their cost of funds 
(LIBOR, London Inter Bank Offer Rate) and the loan rate that they offer 
LDC borrowers. Also, they increase the amount of the loan and length of 
the maturity of the loan. Commercial banks give loans to LDCs with very 
favorable terras only when loan demand from sources in the developed world 
is not enough to be profitable for them. Darity considers four 
hypotheses which are related to the loan-push phenomenon. These four 
hypotheses are the following: 
a. The rational expectations hypothesis. This hypothesis is 
explained and justified as follows; 
LDCs are becoming the raajor global industrial sites. 
Deindustrialization in the developed countries and industriali­
zation in the LDCs has shifted the marginal product of capital. 
The rate of return on capital in the LDCs has risen relative to 
the developed countries. The structural change in the world 
econoray, which has shifted industrial growth toward sorae of 
these LDCs, is the fundamental cause of the increase in debt 
(Darity, 1986, p. 205). 
Another argument in the context of the rational expectation 
approach is that the debt crisis is the outcorae of a random 
shock such as a sudden increase in oil price. The oil price 
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shock sent the borrowing nations into difficulty on their debt 
payments. 
The other argument in this framework is that bankers made 
the loans expecting the majority of them to go bad, or at least 
being indifferent to whether or not the loans went bad. This is 
because there is the possibility that a loan that is bad from 
the standpoint of repayment and use of it need not be bad from 
the standpoint of bank profitability. The other reason is that 
the larger banks have a reasonable pecuniary incentive for 
setting up the foreign loan syndication. These banks usually 
get loan fees for establishing a consortium of lenders and they 
receive this money at first regardless of the fate of the loan. 
Also, U.S. bankers were urged, to lend to the LDCs in the early 
1970s by the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve officials for 
political reasons. Bankers legitimately could believe there was 
a governmental obligation to bail them out in a time of crisis. 
Institutional weaknesses. This hypothesis says that bad loans 
were made because bankers did not have enough information or 
they did not investigate the circumstances of the borrowers 
adequately. 
Overborrowing. This says^that borrowers simply borrowed an 
unreasonable amount of loans. This can be due to lack of good 
sense about policymaking to achieve growth via borrowing on the 
part of LDC finance ministers (Darity, 1986, p. 216), or it can 
be due to the judgments and decisions by national leaders to 
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LDCs, for their personal political objectives and not for 
economic objectives like economic growth and development, 
d. Financial instability hypotheses. This says that when there are 
economic booms in the industrial countries, banks will make more 
loans to LDCs. LDCs will use these loans to repay their 
existing debts and achieve some economic targets. But when 
there are economic downturns in the industrial countries, banks 
are not able to make more loans to the borrowing LDCs. LDCs 
that have been depending on these loans for running their 
economies (repay the interest and principal of existing debts, 
achieving economic growth and development) are not able to meet 
their debt obligations, so they default. In this case, debt 
crisis and economic cycles are interrelated. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Richard P. Mattione 
Richard P. Mattione (Economist and Research Associate at the 
Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Studies Program) also identifies 
three causes of the debt problems of LDCs as external economic shocks, 
internal LDCs' domestic economic policy, and western banks' loan 
policies. But, he disputes the relative importance of each of the above 
three causes. For example, as an external economic shock he considers 
the oil-price shocks which caused a deterioration in the terms of trade 
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of the oil-importing LDCs and caused current account deficits for them 
(Mattione, 1986, p. 45). 
When there are external economic shocks,^ LDCs choose economic 
policies to adjust their economies to those external shocks. Mattione 
examines Table 2.1 in this regard (Claudon, 1986, p. 46). 
Table 2.1. Adjustment efforts 
($ billion) 
in selected developing countries, 1972-82 
Country External shock 
Current account 
change^ Capital flight^ 
Argentina -13.4 -18.9 -14.3 
Brazil -48.5 -23.6 2.0 
Chile -4.8 -8.5 1.0 
Colombia -6.8 -6.6 0.7 
Mexico 11.7 -18.7 -15.2 
Nigeria 32.7 1.0 0.4 
Peru 0.4 1.3 1.3 
Philippines -8.1 -4.4 -1.4 
Venezuela 19.1 19.5 -13.0 
*Adjusted for inflation. 
minus sign denotes capital flight; that is, an unfavorable 
movement in the relevant items of the capital account. 
Four categories of shocks are calculated for each country. These 
shocks are: terms-of-trade shock, variations in Western demand on nonoil 
exports, high real interest rates shock, and current account shock. 
Calculations in this study are based on methods developed by Balassa, 
1981. 
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From Table 2.1 we see that Brazil was the country experiencing the 
biggest dollar shock. But, Brazil actively adjusted itself to the 
external shock in the sense that the current account position 
deteriorated by less than the amount of the unfavorable external shocks. 
The same story is true with respect to the Philippines. Colombia was 
essentially neutral. On the other hand, domestic economic policies in 
Chile and Argentina increased the effects of the unfavorable shocks. 
Also, in Mexico in spite of favorable external shocks, poor internal 
economic policies caused a large deterioration of its current account. 
Poor domestic policies also contributed to capital flight in these 
countries. This was because the real exchange rate appreciated sharply 
from 1978 to 1982 in most of the LDCs. LDCs faced large-scale capital 
flights because of the expectation that higher returns could be earned 
abroad (Claudon, 1986, p. 46). 
Mattione also argues that one of the reasons that LDCs are forced 
into rescheduling their debt is because the debt/export ratios in these 
countries are high. The debt/export ratio is high because there is a gap 
between the short-term loans (these loans are usually eight-year loans 
that banks prefer to lend to LDCs) and the 15 to 30 years necessary for 
LDCs to be able to repay (Claudon, 1986, p. 48). In order to fill this 
gap between short-term loans and the long term necessary for the 
payments, LDCs try to borrow more. Therefore, they always have a large 
debt/export ratio; increasing exports in the short run is difficult. 
Mattione argues that the cure of the debt problems of LDCs is that they 
should adopt such domestic policies that contribute to the expansion of 
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their exports. In order to have a successful domestic economic policy to 
achieve the above goal (increasing exports), LDCs should examine the 
global economic environment and the options available to them. In the 
end, Mattione concludes that a sustained recovery in industrial 
countries, if it is supported by continuing adjustment policies in debtor 
nations, can be enough to rescue these countries from their debt problems 
(Claudon, 1986, pp. 43-62). 
Statistical Inference 
William R.. Cline 
William R. Cline (author of several books on the world debt crisis), 
studying the debt problems of LDCs, says that in a broad sense the debt 
problem is a consequence of the transition from inflation to disinflation 
in the world economy. LDCs borrowed money when inflation was high and 
real interest rates were low or even negative. But, now when inflation 
is low and real interest rates are high, borrowed funds by LDCs are no 
longer cheap. Therefore, LDCs are not able to meet their debt servicing 
obligations because of the pressure of the new economic environment 
(Cline, 1984, p. 1). He continues by noting that during the 1970s, banks 
lending funds to LDCs increased sharply due to the following reasons: 
a. There was a large increase in the deposits of the oil exporting 
countries in the western banks and a decrease in the demands for 
bank loans in the industrial countries because of the recession 
in these countries. 
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b. There was growing international competition among European, 
Japanese, and regional U.S. banks for loans to LDCs. 
After the eruption of the debt-servicing problems of the LDCs, lending 
banks realized that they needed better discipline and organization for 
lending funds to LDCs (Cline, 1984, p. 113). Cline argues that lack of 
information and the information gap about the borrowing countries and 
other lending competitors have been the major contributing factors in 
debt crises of the last few years. For example, individual banks did not 
know how rapidly their competitors were expanding lending, especially 
short-term lending, to the LDCs. By the time that banks found out about 
it, the situation was out of control. Cline suggests that a better 
information system can at least make a modest contribution to the ways of 
solving the debt problems (Cline, 1984). 
Cline also conducted a projection model for studying debt and the 
balance of payments of LDCs. The approach of this study was to conduct 
projections of balance of payments and debt for the 19 largest debtor 
countries (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, Venezuela, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Israel, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Chile, Egypt, 
Algeria, Portugal, Peru, Thailand, Romania, Hungary, and Ecuador) for the 
period 1983-86. The study was conducted at the level of the individual 
country. Cline believed if the study were to be conducted considering 
these 19 countries together as one group, then it would disguise the 
severity of debt difficulties that might arise in each individual 
country. The aim of the study is to calculate the external current 
account deficit, other balance of payments items, the external debt for 
33 
each country for each year through 1986 under different assumptions about 
the economic conditions of the world. These different assumptions are 
specified in four areas: the rate of economic growth in industrial 
countries, the international interest rate (LIBOR, London Inter Bank 
Offer Rate), the price of oil, and the real exchange rate of the dollar 
relative to other major currencies. The projection model assumes the 
internal actions of the LDCs, such as their growth rates and their 
exchange rate policies, are given (Cline, 1984, pp. 40-67 and 
Appendix B). 
The results of the basic simulations show three important conclu­
sions. First, growth in the world economy will decrease the severity of 
the debt problem. Second, the debt problem is responsive to the growth 
in the world economy. For example, if the global economic growth rate is 
2-1/2 percent or below, the situation remains little improved or 
deteriorates. Third, there is a powerful tendency for the debt situation 
to improve for the oil-importing countries. To a considerable degree, 
this sharply favorable trend for oil-importing countries is the conse­
quence of substantial increases projected for their exports. 
Cline offers Figure 2.1 for oil exporters as well as oil importers 
from his project model study (Cline, 1984, p. 48). Considering 
Figure 2.1 we should know that oil exports are more vital to the oil 
exporters than oil imports to the oil importers, because oil exports are 
78 percent of the total exports of the oil exporting countries, on the 
average. Oil imports are 31 percent of total imports of the oil importer 
countries, on the average. Also, this study shows that with a given 
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three percent rate of growth in the global economy, countries like 
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Korea, Philippines, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Chile, 
Portugal, Thailand, Romania, and Hungary will have an improvement in 
their external debt situation by 1986. These countries had a total debt 
of $361 billion in 1982. Also, the study shows that countries like 
Venezuela, Indonesia, Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Peru, and Ecuador will have 
a deterioration in their debt by 1986. In 1982, these countries had a 
total of $123 billion as a debt. 
A more precise evaluation of the debt problem of the LDCs is 
possible through the application of a statistical model of debt 
rescheduling. Cline uses logit statistical analysis explaining the 
occurrence of debt reschedulings in the period 1967-82 for 60 countries 
(Cline, 1984, Appendix A). This logit statistical analysis shows that 
debt rescheduling is associated with a high debt-service ratio, low ratio 
of reserves to imports, low rate of amortization, high current account 
deficit, low domestic growth rates, and a low level of international 
lending in relative terras (Cline, 1984, p. 67). Finally, he concludes 
that a critical threshold for industrial country growth in 1984-86 is 
three percent annually. If this growth rate can be achieved, the debt 
problems of the LDCs should be manageable and should show considerable 
improvement (Cline, 1984). 
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Theoretical Discussion 
Jtirg Niehans 
Jiirg Niehans (Professor at the University of Bern and Visiting 
Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco) has developed a 
model studying the strategies of debtors as well as creditors. He says, 
"practical men of affairs, bankers, financial writers, and policymakers, 
can often be heard to say that a large part of the bank loans to 
governments of LDCs will never, in the aggregate, be repaid." 
Considering the above fact, he mentions that there is a fundamental 
difference between private domestic loans and international loans. In 
private domestic loans, you have the debt enforcement laws. If a debtor 
defaults on his obligations, he forfeits collateral. That is, his assets 
can be attached, impounded, or turned over to his creditors by a 
bankruptcy court. The debtor is put under strong pressure to live up to 
his obligations. The situation is different for bank loans to LDCs. In 
this case, there is usually no collateral and, at least in practice, no 
access to bankruptcy courts. This makes such loans legally 
unenforceable. Niehans, in his paper, analyzes the LDCs' debt with the 
assumption that there is no law enforcement to make LDCs repay their 
loans. Throughout his paper, he assumes that international lending, 
while important for the levels of output and consumption at any moment, 
has only a negligible influence on the rate of economic growth over 
decades. Niehans presents his model as follows. 
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Consider a country in balanced growth at a rate of g with net 
foreign debt A. Debt expands at the rate of 
Suppose the world interest rate is i. Now the net cash flow to the 
debtor country depends on the difference between new debt (dA/dt) and the 
interest payments on the existing debt (iA). Therefore, the cash flow 
formula is: 
C = ^  - iA = A(^ * ^ - i) = (o - i)A. 
Depending upon the amounts of a and i, C can be positive or negative. 
That means that debtor countries can have trade deficits or surpluses 
(Niehans, 1985). The relationship between a and i depends on the 
relationship between a and g. If the rate of debt expansion (a) is 
different from the rate of economic growth (g), that implies that debt 
either increases beyond any limit relative to national income or else 
shrinks away. Within the framework of balanced growth, we assume a = g. 
In balanced growth we have g = i and as a result of that, the cash flow 
(C) in the above equation goes to zero at all times and so does the trade 
balance; interest payments are continuously reinvested. 
When g < i, the cash flow is negative and the debtor needs a trade 
surplus to finance the excess of interest payments over new lending. If 
g > i, the debtor enjoys a positive cash flow forever, which finances a 
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permanent trade deficit and the present value of the cash flow is 
infinite. 
However, the world is not in balanced growth. This raises the 
question: Under what conditions can a debt crisis generally be avoided 
despite the unenforceability of claims (Niehans, 1985, p. 70)? 
The assumption is that the rate of interest is given by the market, 
but the available amounts of loans may be limited because banks may 
refuse to make loans to LDCs considering the risk of defaults by LDCs. 
Niehans argues that if a debtor country with unenforceable debts is 
able to keep a positive cash flow at all times, then its aggregate 
borrowing is not subject to the usual efficiency criteria according to 
which the marginal return on investment must be no lower than the rate of 
interest (in the case of enforceable debt). If loans, in effect, turn 
into gifts, they cannot be excessive from the borrower's point of view 
(Niehans, 1985). With unenforceable contracts, debtors have an unlimited 
demand for loans. Therefore, the debtor country tries to maximize the 
present value of the cash flows from time zero to infinity. The 
borrowing country wants to maximize; 
I [4$ - iA(t)]e"^ d^t. 
0 
In pursuing this objective, the borrower is constrained not by the cost 
of future debt service, but by the willingness of creditors to lend. If 
the interest rate is assumed to be given by the world market, this 
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constraint expresses itself in a quantitative limitation of the loan 
supply (Niehans, 1985). 
Default will occur at time T if 
/ - iA(t)]e"i(t-T)jt < 0 
T 
for all 9 from T to infinity. Niehans then believes that a rational 
debtor country will use the threat of repudiation to convince its 
creditors to negotiate a rescheduling of debt, lowering of interest 
rates, and extension of new loans. 
Then, he considers the strategy of the creditors. He says that 
creditors have to plan aggregate lending in such a way that the present 
value of future cash flows to the debtor remains positive forever. This 
can be formalized as: 
/ [# - iA(t)]e"i(t-T)dt > 0 
T 
for all T. This is the solvency constraint. The larger the present 
value of the cash flow at any time, the larger is the safety margin 
against insolvency. The solvency constraint is necessary but is not 
sufficient for avoiding a debt crisis. In addition, each creditor must 
be confident that other creditors will continue to lend on an 
ever-increasing scale. In order to achieve that confidence, two things 
should happen. First, the rate of debt expansion eventually should 
approach the rate of growth. Second, creditors should consider the 
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optimal level of debt at a given time. But, with unenforceable claims, 
decentralized decision-making is likely to lead to crisis because 
continued debt service on each loan depends crucially on continued net 
lending by all lenders (Niehans, 1985, pp. 64-78). 
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CHAPTER III. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
In Chapter II, I reviewed some of the literature about the world 
debt crisis. By studying the world debt crisis carefully, authors of the 
literature try to find out why it is that some debtor countries are 
forced to reschedule their debt payments and some are not. Among the 
causes of rescheduling of the debts by debtor countries, they have 
considered some economic indicators and ratios. For each debtor country, 
economic indicators like "ratio of external public debt to GNP," "ratio 
of current account balance to GNP," and so on, hypothetically can be 
considered as having something to do with the nature of the rescheduling 
of debts by debtor countries. For example, if "ratio of external public 
debt to GNP" is a high number for a debtor country, then it is highly 
possible that the country will not be able to meet its debt obligation 
and will be forced to reschedule its debt. William R. Cline has used 
several of these economic indicators and ratios in his study of the world 
debt crisis. As I discussed in Chapter II, Cline develops a statistical 
logit model to estimate the probability of the rescheduling of debts by 
debtor countries. Cline considers such economic ratios as; debt-service 
ratio,^ ratio of reserves to imports, country's domestic rate of economic 
growth, real per capita income, current account deficit to exports of 
goods and services, net debt relative to exports, inflationary erosion of 
debt, amortization rate, the savings rate, and the growth of exports of 
^The debt-service ratio is defined as the ratio of total debt 
services to exports of goods and services. 
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each country under consideration. Then, Cline uses the above ratios as 
independent variables and regresses those ratios against the dependent 
variable, which takes on a value of one when the debtor country has 
rescheduled its debt payments and zero when it has not. Cline concludes 
that the level of real per capita income, saving rate, and inflationary 
erosion of debt are not statistically significant. William R. Cline is 
the only person who uses a logit statistical technique studying the 
problem of debt reschedulings by debtor countries. He wants to see the 
relationships between these selected economic indicators and the 
probability of debt rescheduling by debtor countries. ' The results of 
Cline's study are discussed in Chapter II. 
Objective of Study 
In this study,, my objective is to develop a dichotomous qualitative 
model to study the following questions: 
a) Is there a relationship between the probability of debt 
reschedulings by LDCs and LDCs' economic indicators such as the 
ratio of current account balances to GNP, ratio of external 
public debt to GNP, etc. 
b) If there is a relationship between the probability of debt 
reschedulings by LDCs and some LDCs' economic indicators, then is 
this relationship positive or negative? 
c) Are there any relationships between the probability of debt 
reschedulings by LDCs and some forecasted economic ratios of 
LDCs? 
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I develop my model as follows. There are two groups of LDCs: 
1) LDCs which have rescheduled their debts, because they have not 
been able to meet their debt obligations. 
2) LDCs which have not rescheduled their debts. These LDCs have 
continued to meet their debt obligations. . 
The objective is to extend the tools of linear regression to develop a 
model in which the dependent variable is not continuous. Especially, I 
want to construct a model such that the dependent variable is associated 
with two values, one and zero. 
General Description of the Statistical Technique 
Being Used, in This Study 
Consider the following regression for country i in year t: 
Ri - bo + b^X^^ + bgXgi + + ^ m^mi ®i 
where is the dependent variable, which can adopt one of the two 
values, one or zero, as; 
1 when country i has rescheduled its debt payments. 
h = { 
0 when country i has not rescheduled its debt payments. 
bg, b^, bg, bg b^ are coefficients to be estimated. Xg^, X^^, 
..., X^^ are some economic ratios of country i. For example, X^^ can be 
the ratio of current account balance to GNP for country i, or X2^ can be 
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ratio of external public debt to GNP of country i, and so on. is the 
random residual. 
It is reasonable to expect relationships between Xgi' •••• ^ mi' 
and R^. The aim is to predict the likelihood that an individual country 
i with given X.X_ X . will default or not. Therefore, in this 
XiL mx 
qualitative choice model, we are trying to determine the probability that 
an individual country i with a given set of attributes like X^^, Xg^, 
..., X^^ will make one choice (rescheduling its debt) or the alternative 
(continue to meet its debt obligations). We assume that the probability 
of a country making a given choice is a linear function of the country's 
attributes. Therefore, we have a linear probability model. We also make 
the following assumptions: 
a) is an independently distributed random variable with zero 
mean. 
b) As in the classical linear regression model, we are assuming that 
^li' %2i' *''* ^mi fixed. 
Thus, the above regression equation can be interpreted as describing 
the probability that an individual country i will default or not, given 
the information about the X^^, Xg^, ..., X^^. X^^, X^^ are 
economic ratios and indicators of country i. 
Coefficients b^, b^, b^ b^ measure the effect on the 
probability of default of a unit change in the X,., X„ X ., 
xX 6X inx 
respectively. 
The interpretation of equation (3.1) as a linear probability model 
comes about when we take the expected value of each dependent variable 
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observation R^: 
E(Ri) = bg + + bgXgi + bgXg^ + ... + b^X^^^ . 
Since can take on only two values, one and zero, we can describe the 
probability distribution of R^ by letting: 
and 
So, 
Prob(R^ = 1) = 
Prob(R^ = 0) = 1 - P^. 
E(R^) = P^(l) + (1 - P^)0 = P^. 
Therefore, we can write: 
E(Ri) - bg + bjXj. + + bjXj. + ... + . P.. 
We use the ordinary least squares estimation technique for unbiased 
estimations of parameters. Using the ordinary least squares technique 
for estimation results in heteroscedasticity in the linear probability 
model. It means that the variance of the error terra is not constant for 
all observations. The presence of heteroscedasticity results in a loss 
of efficiency (we say that b is an efficient unbiased estimator of b, if 
for a given sample size the variance of b is smaller than the variance of 
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any other unbiased estimator) but it does not in itself result in either 
biased or inconsistent parameter estimates (Ladd, 1966). 
There is one major problem with the linear probability model. When 
we try to use the linear probability model for prediction, the serious 
weakness of the model becomes apparent. Since the linear probability 
model involves the interpretation of predicted values of as 
probabilities, we are faced with a problem when the predicted value lies 
outside the (0, 1) range. One way to correct this problem is to set 
extreme predictions equal to one or zero to constrain predicted 
probabilities to be within the (0, 1) interval. But, this solution of 
the problem is not satisfactory because it says that we may predict an 
occurrence with a probability of one when it is entirely possible that it 
may not occur. Or, we may predict an occurrence with probability zero 
when it may actually occur. Therefore, while the estimation procedure 
might yield unbiased estimates, the predictions obtained from the 
estimation process are biased. The better way to solve the problem is as 
follows: 
We want to transform the original model in such a way that 
predictions will be in the (0, 1) interval for all Xs. Since our primary 
concern is to interpret the dependent variable in the model as the 
probability of making a choice (given information about the individual 
country's attributes), it is reasonable to use some notion of probability 
as the basis of the transformation. The requirement of such a process is 
that it translates the values of the attributes X.., X- X . which 
XIL 6% miL 
may range in value over the entire real line to a probability which 
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ranges in value from zero to one. Also, we want the transformation to 
maintain the property that increases (or decreases) in the Xs are 
associated with increases (or decreases) in the dependent variable for 
all values of Xs (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, p. 280). Therefore, we 
use a cumulative probability function.^ The resulting probability-
distribution may be represented as: 
Pi - F(b„ + bjXj. + bjXji + + b^X^) (3.2) 
where F is the cumulative probability function and the Xs are 
stochastic. 
While there are a lot of different cumulative probability functions, 
we shall consider the probit probability model, which is associated with 
the cumulative normal probability function. To understand this model, 
assume that there exists a theoretical (but not actually measured) index, 
Z^, for each country i. 
is determined by the explanatory variables X^^, Xg^, ..., X^^^, as 
in the linear probability model. The index, Z^, is assumed to be a 
continuous variable that is random and normally distributed for the usual 
econometric reasons. Therefore, we have: 
Z. = bn + b.X,. + b,X„. + ... + b X .. (3.3) 
1 • 1 li 2 2i m mi 
The cumulative probability function is defined as having as its 
value the probability that an observed value of a variable X (for every 
X) will be less than or equal to a particular X. The range of the 
cumulative probability function is the (0, 1) interval, since all 
probabilities lie between zero and one. 
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Substituting into equation (3.2), we get: 
What makes this problem different from the standard problem in 
econometrics is that we assume that observations on are not available. 
Instead, we have data which distinguish only whether individual 
observations are in the one category (high values of the index Z^) or a 
second category (low values of Z^). 
The problem that probit analysis solves is the problem of how to 
obtain estimates for the parameters bg, b^, b^, .... b^ while at the same 
time obtaining information about the underlying unmeasured scale index 
Z^. To understand the technique, we consider the following example. 
The individual country i is assumed to reschedule its debt or not 
when it is faced with the choice of one of the two. In this case, the 
index Z^ would represent the strength of the decision of country i for 
rescheduling of its debt. The index Z^ varies by country but more 
importantly it is an index that is not observable from available data. 
All we know is whether country i rescheduled its debt or not. Now 
suppose that we also know that the index of the strength of the debtor 
country's decision Z. is a linear function of X.., X„ X .. Then, 
X xx 6X mx 
the probit model provides a suitable means of estimating the parameters 
of the relationships between the index Z. and X,., X_ X .. 
X X X 6 X inx 
Now, the question is how does the index Z^ relate to the actual 
available information about the debt rescheduling of country i? To 
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answer this question, assume that for each country i, Z^* represents the 
critical cut-off value which translates the underlying index, Z^, into a 
decision-making. So, country i decides to reschedule its debt if 
Z. > Z.* or decides not to reschedule its debt if Z. < Z.*. 
1 1  1 — 1  
The probit model assumes that Z^* is a normally distributed random 
variable so that the probability that Z^* is less than or equal to Z^ can 
be computed from the cumulative normal probability function. The 
cumulative normal function assigns to a number Z^ the probability that 
any arbitrary Z^* will be less than or equal to Z^. 
The standardized cumulative normal function is 
P. = F(Z ) = 4= ds. 
/2TT -® 
Where S is a random variable which is normally distributed with zero mean 
and unit variance. By construction, will lie in the (0, 1) interval. 
P^ represents the probability of country i's decision to reschedule its 
debt (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, Chapter 10). 
When we use the probit model with individual observations, the most 
suitable estimation technique is that of maximum likelihood. In the 
maximum likelihood estimation, all parameter estimators are consistent 
and also efficient. All parameter estimators are known to be normal so 
that the regression t-test can be applied. If we wish to test the 
significance of all or a subset of the coefficients in the probit model 
when maximum likelihood is used, a test using the chi-square distribution 
replaces the usual F test. 
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General Description of What I Want 
to Do in This Study 
1) I will use a probit model to estimate the probability of default 
by each debtor country. For that I will divide LDCs into two groups as: 
a) LDCs that have rescheduled their debt payments, and 
b) LDCs that have not rescheduled their debt payments, i.e., they 
have continued to fulfill their debt obligations. 
Then, I will calculate the following seven economic ratios and 
indicators ; 
1) the ratio of gross domestic investment to GNP, 
2) the ratio of gross national savings to GNP, 
3) the ratio of current account balance to GNP, 
4) the ratio of gross international reserves to imports, 
5) the ratio of interest payments on external public debt to 
exports, 
5) the ratio of external public debt to GNP, and 
7) the ratio of debt service to GNP. 
For each country i, I will take the above seven economic ratios and 
indicators as independent variables. The dependent variable will be 
assigned one when country i has rescheduled its debt payments and zero 
when country i continues to meet its debt obligations. I will have a 
linear probability model for each country i in year t as: 
^it " *0 * ^ l^lit •*" ®2^2it "*• ^3%3it ®4^4it ®5^5it 
^5^6it *7*7it ^it 
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where i denotes the country i and it takes on values 1, 2, 3, ..., 44— 
i.e., I will run the above linear probability model across 44 countries 
in year t. 
Then, by the method of transformation that I described before, I 
will transform the above linear probability model into a probit 
probability model. Therefore, by that transformation, I will be able to 
estimate the probability of default by country i in year t given country 
i's set of attributes X^, Xg» Xg» •••. . 
Xiit = The ratio of gross domestic investment to GNP for country i 
in year t. 
^2it ~ ratio of gross national savings to GNP for country i in 
year t. 
^3it ~ ratio of current account balance to GNP for country i in 
year t. 
X^^^ = The ratio of gross international reserves to imports for 
country i in year t. 
Xsit = The ratio of interest payments on external public debt to 
exports for country i in year t. 
Xg^^ = The ratio of external public debt to GNP for country i in 
year t. 
Xy^^ = The ratio of debt service to GNP for country i in year t. 
= The dependent variable for country i in year t where: 
1 when country i has rescheduled its debt payments in 
year t 
Yit = £ 
0 when country i has not rescheduled its debt payments 
in the year t, i.e., it has continued to meet its 
debt obligations. 
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The above model will be estimated by using ordinary least squares 
for the linear probability model and the maximum likelihood technique for 
the probit probability model, is an independently distributed random 
variable with zero mean. 
I will run the above regression model for 44 countries and for the 
years 1983 and 1984. These 44 countries and their positions with respect 
to rescheduling of their debt in different years are shown in Table 3.1. 
I will analyze the relationships between the above econometric ratios of 
country i and the probability of default by country i in each year. 
Then, I will compare the results of years 1983 and 1984 to each other. I 
will also compare ray results to William R. Cline's results. There are 
two economic ratios, the ratio of reserves to imports and the ratio of 
gross national savings to GNP, which I use in my study and Cline uses in 
his study. 
2) In the second part of this section of ray study, again I apply a 
linear probability raodel for the sarae countries, but this time I use 
seven different economic ratios as independent variables. Therefore, the 
linear probability raodel for country i in year t will be: 
^it " ^0 + biWiit + bgWgit ^ ^ 3^3it ^4^4it ^S^Sit 
^ô^ôit ^7^7it *it 
where i stands for country i and takes on values 1, 2, 3 44. 
Again, I will transform the above linear probability raodel into the 
probit probability raodel, so I will be able to estimate the probability 
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Table 3.1. Debt rescheduling among the 44 LDCs which are considered in 
this study for the years 1983 and 1984 
Names of the Rescheduling position 
countries 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Algeria 0 0 0 °b 0 
Argentina 0 0 0 1^ 1 
Bolivia 0 1 0 1 1 
Brazil 0 0 0 1 1 
Cameroon 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0 1 0 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 1 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 1 1 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala" 0 0 0 •0 0 
India 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 1 
Jamaica 0 1 0 1 1 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 
Korea (South) 0 0 0 0 0 
Liberia 1 1 1 1 1 
Malawi 0 0 1 1 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 1 1 1 
Morocco 0 0 0 1 1 
Niger 0 0 0 1 1 
Nigeria 0 0 0 1 0 
Pakistan 0 1 0 0 0 
Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 0 1 • 1 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 0 1 1 1 1 
Sierra Leone 1 0 0 0 1 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 
Sudan 0 1 1 1 1 
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0 
^0 means the country has not rescheduled its debt, i.e., it has 
continued to meet its debt services. 
means the country has rescheduled its debt. 
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Table 3.1. Continued 
Names of the Rescheduling position 
countries 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Turkey 0 1 0 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0 1 0 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 1 
Yugoslavia 0 0 0 . 1 1 
Zaire 1 1 0 1 0 
Zambia 0 0 0 1 1 
of default by country i in year t given country i's set of attributes, 
, W^, ..., Wy. The economic ratios are : 
= Ratio of international reserves to imports of goods and 
services for country i for year t. 
^2it ~ Ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed^ to exports of goods 
and services for country i for year t. 
^3it ~ B^tio of debt outstanding and disbursed to GNP (Gross 
National Product) for country i for year t. 
= Ratio of total debt services to exports of goods and services 
(debt-service ratio)' for country i for year t. 
= Ratio of total debt services to GNP for country i for year 
t. 
= Ratio of interest payments to exports of goods and services 
(interest-service ratio) for country i for year t. 
^Debt outstanding and disbursed represents the amount of public and 
publicly guaranteed loans that have been disbursed, net of repayments of 
principal and write-offs at year end. 
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= Ratio of international reserves to debt outstanding and 
disbursed for country i for year t. 
= The dependent variable for country i in year t where; 
1 if country i has rescheduled its debt payments in 
year t 
Yit = ( 
0 if country i has not rescheduled its debt payments 
in year t and it has continued to meet its debt 
obligations. 
a^^ = Independently distributed random variable with zero mean. 
This model will be estimated using ordinary least squares estimation 
techniques for the linear probability model and maximum likelihood 
estimation techniques for the probit probability model. I will run the 
above regression model for the same 44 countries and for the year 1984. 
I will analyze the relationships between the above economic ratios 
of country i and the probability of default by country i in the year 
1984. Also, in the end of this section I will pool the data for the 
years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 and run the above regression for 
the data of these years combined. (In the next chapter I will describe 
the procedure of pooling the data.) And, I do compare the results of 
these different studies. 
There are a few economic ratios, such as the ratio of gross inter­
national reserves to imports of goods and services, the ratio of debt 
outstanding and disbursed to GNP, the ratio of total debt services to 
GNP, and the ratio of interest payments on external public debt to 
exports of goods and services, which are common in both previous parts, 
i.e., (in part 1) and in this part (part 2). The reason for using the 
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same economic ratios in both studies (both parts 1 and 2) is that the 
data sources are different. In part 1 I use the data from various issues 
of World Development Reports (World Bank, various issues), and I 
calculate several of these economic ratios (I will list them in the next 
chapter) using those data, whereas in part 2 I use the data from various 
issues of World Debt Tables (World Bank, various issues). Although both 
of these publications are by the World Bank, in some cases the numbers 
are different. Therefore, in order to dismiss any confusion and 
uncertainty, I have decided to use both of these data sets (economic 
ratios) in my study in two independent parts (parts 1 and 2). The ratio 
of total debt services to exports of goods and services (debt-service 
ratio) is different from the ratio of interest payments on external 
public debt to exports of goods and services. This is so because by 
definition (this definition is given hy the World Bank, 1985, p. 236), 
the total debt service is the sum of the interest payments on external 
public debt and repayments of principal on external public debt. 
We expect the following signs for the coefficients of the variables 
(economic ratios) under consideration; 
The sign of the coefficient of the ratio of international reserves 
to imports of goods and services should be negative. Because when 
reserves are high it is likely that, when the country imports more than 
exports, it can meet the obligation through drawdowns of its reserves. 
Therefore, the higher is the ratio of international reserves to imports, 
the lower is going to be the probability of demand for rescheduling the 
debt by debtor country i. 
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The ratio of total debt services to exports of goods and services 
(debt-service ratio) should have a coefficient with positive sign. This 
ratio is an indicator for creditworthiness. The higher the ratio of debt 
services to exports of goods and services, the greater will be the 
likelihood that in the event of a severe decline in export earnings the 
country will no longer be able to meet debt-service obligations. 
The above story is true when we consider the ratio of interest 
payments on external public debt to exports of goods and services 
(interest-service ratio). Since debt service is the sum of the interest 
payments on external debt and repayments of principal on external debt, 
the debt-service ratio and interest service ratio have the same nature. 
So we expect that the sign of the coefficient of interest-service 
ratio be positive too. It means .the higher the ratio of interest 
payments on external public debt to exports of goods and services 
(intetest-service ratio) is, the higher will be the probability of debt 
rescheduling by the debtor country i. 
Sign of the coefficient of the ratio of debt outstanding and 
disbursed to exports of goods and services should be positive. The 
higher is the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to exports of goods 
and services the higher will be the likelihood that the earning from 
exports of goods and services is not enough to service the debt and, 
hence, rescheduling of debt service may be requested. We conclude that a 
higher debt to exports ratio means a higher probability of debt 
rescheduling by debtor country i. 
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The coefficient of the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to 
GNP should be positive meaning the higher the ratio of debt outstanding 
and disbursed to GNP is, the higher the probability of debt rescheduling 
by country i will be. The coefficient of the ratio of total debt 
services to GNP should be position; it can be interpreted that a higher 
ratio of total debt services to GNP increases the likelihood of debt 
rescheduling by debtor country i. 
The sign for the coefficient of international reserves to debt 
outstanding and disbursed should be negative, since higher international 
reserves relative to debt enables the debtor country to meet its debt 
obligations in the time of severe economic situation. 
The ratio of gross national savings to GNP should have a negatively 
signed coefficient, because when saving is a higher portion of GNP, then 
the potential of the country to repay its debt is higher. Then, the 
higher gross national savings to GNP decreases the probability of debt 
rescheduling by debtor country i. 
If investment is taking place in country i and if investment is 
efficient and productive, it can increase income of the country. 
Therefore, the country with higher income is more likely to be able to 
face economic difficulties. Therefore, in a country in which investment 
is a greater portion of its GNP, the possibility of meeting debt obliga­
tions is higher. Using the above facts, I expect a negative sign for the 
coefficient of ratio of gross domestic investment to GNP. This means if 
a debtor country i has a higher ratio of gross domestic investment to 
GNP, the likelihood that country i reschedules its debt is lower. 
59 
The sign of the coefficient of the last variable (ratio of current 
account balance to GNP) under consideration is positive. If a debtor 
country i has a deficit in its current account balance, and if the 
country i is short of international reserves, the probability of debt 
rescheduling by country i should be close to one. Therefore, the sign of 
the coefficient should be positive. 
3) In the last part of my study, I apply a linear probability model 
for the same countries, but this time I will use seven forecasted 
economic ratios (the same seven economic ratios that I used in the second 
part) as independent variables. Therefore, the linear probability model 
for country i in year t (where year t is 1985) will be; 
^it " Cg + + CgWgit + ^3^3it ^4^4it ^5^5it ^5^6it 
cyWyit *it 
where i stands for country i and takes on values 1, 2, 3, ..., 44. Also, 
I will transform the above linear probability model into the probit 
probability model, so I will be able to estimate the probability of 
default by country i in year t given country i's set of attributes , 
^2 * ^2 ' • • • » * 
= Forecasted value of the ratio of international reserves to 
imports of goods and services for country i for year t. 
^2it ~ Forecasted value of the ratio of debt outstanding and 
disbursed to exports of goods and services for country i for 
year t. 
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Forecasted value of the ratio of debt outstanding and 
disbursed to GNF (Gross National Product) for country i for 
year t. 
Forecasted value of the ratio of total debt services to 
exports of goods and services (forecasted value of 
debt-service ratio) for country i for year t. 
Forecasted value of the ratio of total debt services to GNF 
for country i for year t. 
Forecasted value of the ratio of interest payments to exports 
of goods and services for country i for year t. 
Forecasted value of the ratio of international reserves to 
debt outstanding and disbursed for country i for year t. 
I run the above regression for forecasted economic ratios for 1985. 
Then, I will study and analyze the results. I will use regression 
forecasting techniques to forecast the independent variables , 
.... Wy for each country i for the year 1985. Since I have only 11 
years of annual data, the forecasting method is per force naive; I simply 
extrapolate from a linear time trend. Comparing the first set of 
economic ratios (in part 1) and the second set of economic ratios (in 
part 2) I have to mention the following: 
I have only two years of observations for the economic ratios in 
part 1, i.e., I have two years of data for 1983 and 1984. These data are 
not enough for forecasting, whereas I can provide data (data for the 
economic ratios, and not data for the rescheduling position) for the 
years 1970, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 
"3it = 
"4it-
"Sit ' 
"eit • 
w, 7it 
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1984, if I consider the economic ratios in part 2. In this case, I can 
use these ratios (economic ratios in part 2) to get the forecasted 
economic ratios for 1985. Therefore, this is the reason why I use the 
second economic ratios for part 3 of my study. 
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CHAPTER IV. DATA AND RESULTS 
1) In this section, for each debtor country i I consider the 
following regression; 
Pt = «0 "i^it ®2^2t "3^3t ®At *5%5t 
"6^6t ^l^lt S 
where t stands for the year under consideration and P is the probability 
of rescheduling of the debt by debtor country i and, of course 0 £ P £ 1. 
OQ, a^, ..., «y are coefficients. X^, X^, X^, ..., Xy are economic 
ratios (indicators) of debtor country i and are defined as: 
X^ = ratio of gross domestic investment to GNP, 
Xg = ratio of national savings to GNP, 
X^ = ratio of current account balance to GNP, 
X^ = ratio of gross international reserves to imports, 
Xg = ratio of interest payments on external public debt to exports, 
Xg = ratio of external public debt to GNP, and 
Xy = ratio of debt services to GNP. 
The data are obtained from various issues of World Development Reports 
published by the World Bank. (The first three ratios are taken from 
various issues of World Development Reports and the last five ratios are 
calculated by using the data from various issues of World Development 
Reports.) 
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First, I consider the data for 1983. Therefore, equation (4.1) is 
estimated as a probit probability model for 1983. The six alternative 
models shown in Table 4.1 represent alternative combinations of economic 
ratios (variables) when some variables are excluded. If we consider 
model A, we see that only variables (ratio of interest payments on 
external public debt to exports), Xg (ratio of public debt to GNP), and 
Xy (ratio of debt services to GNP) are highly significant. We can 
interpret them as follows: the ratio of interest payments on external 
public debt to exports is highly significant (it has high "t" statistic,^ 
i.e., it is significant at five percent) and carries the expected 
positive sign, meaning a higher ratio of interest payments on external 
public debt to exports causes a higher probability of rescheduling. The 
same thing is true with respect to variable Xg. This means the ratio of 
external public debt to GNP is highly significant (it has a high 
t-statistic, i.e., it is significant at one percent) and has the expected 
positive sign. This can be interpreted as a higher ratio of external 
public debt to GNP causes a higher probability of rescheduling. Now, if 
we look at variable Xy (ratio of debt services to GNP), it is significant 
(it has a high t-statistic, i.e., it is significant at five percent) but 
surprisingly it has an unexpected negative sign. This means higher ratio 
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of debt services to GNP causes a lower probability of rescheduling. % 
t-statistic of equal or greater than 12.571 indicates that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the one percent level 
of significance. A t-statistic of equal or greater than 11.961 indicates 
that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the five 
percent level of significance. Also, a t-statistic of equal or greater 
than 11.641 indicates that the coefficient is significantly different 
from zero at the ten percent level of significance. 
Table 4.1. Estimation of the probit model of debt reschedulings 
Model A B C D E F 
Xl 2.0343 
(.76263)° 
1.9404 
(.047435) 
_a 
- - -
X2 -1.9826 
(-.74396) 
-1.9762 
(-.048308) 
— - - -.04124 
(1.0830) 
X3 2.0303 
(.76246) 
1.9177 
(.046878) 
-
- .072155 
(1.3179) 
-
X4 .72719 
(.96928) 
.34972 
(.62602) 
- .22726 
(.34430) 
-
-
X5 13.971 
(2.0225) 
- 10. 
(2. 
214 
1295) 
9.6625 
(1.9234) 
8.8416 
(1.7582) 
11.313 
(2.1965) 
% .086998 
(3.0671) 
-
(3. 
048192 
2067) 
.049597 
(3.1476) 
.066251 
(3.0243) 
.062765 
(2.9707) 
X7 -.47364 
(-2.4646) 
-
(-2. 
27601 
1671) 
-.27694 
(-2.1666) 
-.29417 
(-2.1793) 
-.35982 
(-2.3674) 
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Reschedulings 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Chi-squared 29.3505 5.899 20. 2952 20.4127 22.2238 21.5326 
Degrees of freedom 7 4 3 4 4 4 
means not included. 
^T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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(chi-squared) is significant at .5 percent. This suggests variation in 
the probability of rescheduling is very well explained by these 
considered economic ratios in the multiple regression equation (equation 
4.1). 
In models C, D, and F, again we see that variables Xg, Xg, and Xy 
2 
are significant. Also, % is significant at the .5 percent level for 
those models. The interpretations of the results of models C, D, and F 
are exactly the same as the interpretation of model A in all aspects. 
In model E, when we have a combination of variables X^, Xg, Xg, and 
Xy, we see that only variables Xg and Xy are significant. This means the 
ratio of external public debt to GNP (Xg) is significant at one percent 
and has the expected positive sign. Therefore, we can conclude that a 
higher ratio of external public debt to GNP causes a higher probability 
of rescheduling. Also, variable Xy (ratio of debt service's to GNP) is 
significant at five percent and has the unexpected negative sign, meaning 
a higher ratio of debt services to GNP causes a lower probability of 
rescheduling. Again, this is surprisingly against the expected sign. 
2 
X for model E is significant at .5 percent meaning the variation in 
probability of rescheduling is very well explained by considered economic 
variables X^, Xg, Xg, and Xy in model E. In model B, none of the 
2 
economic ratios is significant, also % is not significant. 
In general, we can conclude that there are three economic ratios, 
namely X^ (ratio of interest payments on external public debt to 
exports), Xg (ratio of external public debt to GNP), and Xy (ratio of 
debt services to GNP), which are significant in models A, C, D and F. 
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Economic ratio Xg is significant in model E, and economic ratio Xy, 
although it is significant in model E, has the unexpected negative sign. 
The probability of rescheduling the debt by debtor country i can be 
explained by looking at economic ratios Xg, Xg, and Xy. In other words, 
the probability of rescheduling of the debt by country i is influenced by 
these economic ratios; Xg, Xg, and Xy. Xy (ratio of debt services to 
GNP), although it influences the probability of rescheduling the debt by 
country i, has the unexpected negative sign. 
Apparently, variables X^ (ratio of gross domestic investment to 
GNP) , Xg (ratio of gross national savings to GNP), X^ (ratio of current 
account balance to GNP), and X^ (ratio of gross international reserves to 
imports) are not influential factors in rescheduling the debt by debtor 
country i. 
In this part of section 1, again I use the same seven economic 
ratios (variables), X^, Xg, Xg, ..., Xy. But, this time I consider the 
data for the year 1984. Therefore, equation (4.1) is estimated as a 
probit probability model for 1984. Data are obtained from various issues 
of World Development Reports published by the World Bank and again some 
of the ratios are calculated from the data. 
The six alternative models shown in Table 4.2 represent alternative 
combinations of economic ratios (variables) when some variables (economic 
ratios) are excluded. 
In model A, three variables, X^ (ratio of interest payments on 
external public debt to exports), Xg (ratio of external public debt to 
GNP), and Xy (ratio of debt services to GNP), are significant. Xg (ratio 
of interest payments on external public debt to exports) is significant 
Table 4.2. Estimation of the probit model of debt rescheduling 
Model A B C D £ F 
Xl .51801 
(1.1072)0 
.50210 
(.028496) 
" -
_a 
-
-
X2 -.46389 
(-1.0045) 
-.52290 
(-.29676) 
- - - -.008419 
(.29642) 
X3 .45251 
(.98209) 
.48495 
(.027522) 
- - .003586 
(.096481) 
-
X4 .54256 
(.73850) 
.37646 
(.64246) 
- .11961 
(.18757) 
- -
X5 8.4460 
(2.1610) 
- 5.7186 
(1.8723) 
5.4556 
(1.6268) 
5.6849 
(1.8483) 
5.8200 
(1.8896) 
X6 .03500 
(2.6911) 
- .027491 
(2.6788) 
.027977 
(2.6391) 
.027899 
(2.5060) 
.029247 
(2.4604) 
X7 -.36484 
(-2.6284) 
- -.19451 
(-1.9619) 
-.19564 
(-1.9722) 
-.19578 
(-1.9489) 
-.20644 
(-1.9237) 
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Reschedulings 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Chi-squared 15.9445 3.71564 11.1633 11.1986 11.1726 11.2509 
Degrees of freedom 7 4 3 4 4 4 
means not included. 
^T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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at five percent and carries the expected positive sign. It can be 
interpreted as: a higher ratio of interest payments on external public 
debt to exports causes a higher probability of rescheduling of the debt 
by debtor country i. 
Variable Xg (ratio of external public debt to GNP) is significant at 
one percent and has the expected positive sign. It means a higher ratio 
of external public debt to GNP causes a higher probability of 
rescheduling. Now, again, if we look at variable Xy (ratio of debt 
services to GNP) it is significant at one percent, but the coefficient 
has the negative sign which is unexpected. That means a higher ratio of 
debt services to GNP causes a lower probability of debt rescheduling by 
2 
the debtor country i. For model A, % (chi-squared) is significant at 
the five percent level of significance. This gives the information that 
variation in the probability of rescheduling of debt by debtor country i 
is very well explained by considering the economic ratios X^, X^, X^, 
Xy in model A. In model B, none of the variables, X^, X2, Xg, and 
X^, are significant meaning they do not affect the probability of the 
2 
rescheduling of debt by the debtor country i. Also, % for model B is 
not significant. So, variation in the probability of rescheduling is not 
explained by X^, X^, X^, and X^. 
The interpretations of models C, D, E, and F are exactly like the 
interpretation of model A. In models C, D, E, and F again we see that 
variables X^, Xg, and Xy are significant at five, one, and five percent, 
2 
respectively. Also, % is significant at 0.5 percent. So, in general if 
we run regression equation (4.1) for 1984, there are three economic 
ratios, Xg (the ratio of interest payments on external public debt to 
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exports), Xg (ratio of external public debt to GNP), and Xy (ratio of 
debt services to GNP), which are significant considering all different 
combinations. 
By running regression equation (4.1) for the years 1983 and 1984 and 
by looking at the results of different models (shown in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2), we can conclude that the probability of rescheduling the debt by 
debtor country i can be explained by looking at economic ratios X^, Xg, 
and Xy. Economic ratios X^, Xg, and Xy are the three main variables that 
influence the probability of debt rescheduling by debtor country i. 
However, economic ratio Xy (ratio of debt services to GNP), although it 
influences the probability of debt rescheduling by debtor country i, has 
the unexpected negative sign. Variables X^ (the ratio of gross domestic 
investment to GNP), X^ (the ratio of gross national savings to GNP), X^ 
(the ratio of current account balance to GNP), and X^(the ratio of gross 
international reserves to imports) are not influential factors causing 
changes in the probability of debt rescheduling by the debtor country i. 
Comparing the results with the study by William R. Cline (1984) 
(mentioned in Chapter II), I get the following: here X^ (the ratio of 
gross international reserves to imports) is not significant but in 
Cline's study this ratio is significant and has the expected negative 
sign. Xg (the ratio of gross national savings to GNP) is not significant 
in ray study nor is it in Cline's study. X^ and X^ are the only common 
ratios between this study and Cline's study. 
2) In this part I consider the following probit probability model 
for each country i: 
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^0 •*" ^l^lt ^2^2t ^3^3t ^  * "'" 
+ byW,t + a^ (4.2) 
where t stands for the year under consideration and P is the probability 
of debt rescheduling by debtor country i and, of course, 0 ^  P £ 1. 
Again, W^, Wg Wy are economic ratios (indicators) of the debtor 
country i and they are defined as: 
= Ratio of international reserves to imports of goods and 
services. 
= Ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to exports of goods and 
services. 
Wg = Ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to GNP. 
= Ratio of total debt services to exports of goods and services 
(debt-service ratio). 
Wg = Ratio of total debt services to GNP. 
Wg = Ratio of interest payments to exports of goods and services 
(interest-service ratio). 
Wy = Ratio of international reserves to debt outstanding and 
disbursed. 
Equation (4.2) is estimated as a probit probability model for data for 
the year 1984. The six alternative models are shown in Table 4.3. These 
represent alternative combinations of the economic ratios (variables) 
when some economic ratios (variables) are counted out. The data are 
obtained from various issues of World Debt Tables published by the World 
Bank. 
Table 4.3. Estimation of the probit model of debt reschedulings 
Model A B C D E F 
*1 -.16313 (.59221)0 
-.31051 
(-2.2769) 
_a 
- - -.30793 
(-2.1896) 
W2 -.0019341 
(-.82641) 
- - -.00012467 
(.065212) 
-.001999 
(-1.0144) 
-.00013302 
(.072626) 
W3 -.0002025 
(-.01845) 
-
- -.012295 
(1.5774) 
-.0039446 
(.45136) 
-
W4 -.081997 
(-1.6405) 
-.072294 
(-1.5824) 
-.076709 
(-1.6139) 
-.036979 
(-1.5356) 
- -.072114 
(-1.5774) 
W5 .022267 
(.34956) 
-
- - - -
*6 .062937 
(.90678) 
.096877 
(1.5423) 
.069125 
(1.1172) 
- - .095860 
(1.4908) 
*7 -.096467 
(-1.7807) 
- -.065425 
(-2.6702) 
- -.071779 
(-2.4028) 
-
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Reschedulings 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Chi-squared 15.8505 9.91364 14.3166 5.19238 12.2052 9.9189 
Degrees of 
freedom 7 3 3 3 3 4 
means not included. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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In model A, there are two variables, (the ratio of total debt 
services to exports of goods and services or debt-service ratio) and Wy 
(the ratio of international reserves to debt outstanding and disbursed), 
which are significant. Variable is significant at the ten percent 
level but has an unexpected negative sign indicating that the higher the 
ratio of debt-service, the lower the probability of debt rescheduling by 
debtor country i. Wy is significant at the five percent level and has 
the expected negative sign, which can be interpreted as, the higher the 
ratio of international reserves to debt outstanding and disbursed, the 
2 
lower the probability of debt rescheduling by debtor country i. % (chi-
squared) for model A is significant at the five percent level, indicating 
variation in the probability of debt reschedulings is very well explained 
by the considered variables W^, Wy in model A, The same story 
is true for model C in every aspect. 
In model B, only variable (the ratio of international reserves to 
imports of goods and services) is significant at the five percent level 
and has the correct negative sign. This shows that the higher the ratio 
of international reserves to imports of goods and services, the lower the 
2 
probability of debt rescheduling by debtor country i. % for model B is 
significant at the .5 percent level. Therefore, variables which are 
considered in model B strongly explain the variation in probability of 
debt rescheduling by country i. The same thing is exactly true 
considering model F in all details. 
In model D, none of the variables are significant. In model E, only 
variable (the ratio of international reserves to debt outstanding and 
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disbursed) is significant at the five percent level and has the expected 
negative sign. This suggests that the higher the ratio of international 
reserves to debt outstanding and disbursed, the lower the probability of 
debt rescheduling by debtor country i. 
3) As we saw in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter, there are two 
economic ratios—the debt-service ratio and ratio of debt services to 
GNP—which are significant (they have a significant effect on the 
probability of debt rescheduling) but have unexpected negative signs. We 
had the results that the higher the debt-service ratio (or ratio of debt 
services to GNP), the lower the probability of debt rescheduling by 
debtor country i. 
In order to confirm these unexpected signs (whether these signs are 
statistically correct or not), I decided to combine all the data for the 
years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 and run regression equation (4.2) 
again with the same seven economic ratios. The way that I have combined 
the data is as follows: First, I take the data for the 44 countries and 
for the year 1980, then I add the data for the same 44 countries and for 
the year 1981 to the data of the year 1980 vertically. I do the same 
thing for the data of the years 1982, 1983, and 1984, i.e., I add them up 
vertically to the combined data of 1980 and 1981. Therefore, if we 
consider the regression equation: 
^it ^0 ^  ^ l^lit ^2^2it ^ ^ 3^3it + + ^7^7it ^it 
i the the number of observations and it goes from one to 220. The data 
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are collected from different issues of World Debt Tables published by the 
World Bank. The results are presented in Table 4.4. Again, I consider 
different combinations for the economic ratios in Table 4.4. 
In model A, two variables, W^ (the debt-service ratio) and Wy (the 
ratio of international reserves to debt outstanding, and disbursed) , are 
highly significant. W^ (the ratio of total debt services to exports of 
goods and services or debt-service ratio) is highly significant (it is 
significant at five percent) , but again it has a negative sign meaning 
the higher the debt-service ratio, the lower the probability of debt 
rescheduling by debtor country i. Therefore, even if we pool the data we 
get the negative sign which is logically unexpected. Wy (the ratio of 
international reserves to debt outstanding and disbursed) is highly 
significant (it is significant at one percent) and has the expected 
negative sign. It says the higher the ratio of international reserves to 
debt for debtor country i, the lower the probability of default by debtor 
2 
country i. Of course, % (chi-squared) is significant at .5 percent, 
confirming that economic ratios considered in model A are very relevant 
to the probability of default. 
In model C, again, variables W^ and Wy are significant at the five 
and one percent level, respectively, both with negative signs and the 
same interpretations as in model A. Of course, in model C, Wg (the ratio 
of interest payments to exports of goods and services or interest-service 
ratio) is significant at one percent and carries the expected positive 
sign. This indicates that the higher the interest-service ratio for 
2 debtor country i, the higher the probability of default by country i. % 
Table 4.4. Estimation of the probit model of debt reschedulings 
Model A B C D E F 
Wl -.18576 
(1.7903)° 
-.13602 
(-3.0288) 
_a 
- - -.103 
(-2.2302) 
«2 .0010410 
(.81038) 
- - .002211 
(2.0146) 
.0010471 
(.96992) 
.0030638 
(3.0414) • 
W3 .0042271 
(.64861) 
- - .014364 
(3.2021) 
.0085072 
(1.7735) 
-
W4 -.056225 
(-2.3814) 
-.045941 
(-2.2646) 
-.053403 
(-2.5167) 
-.019456 
(-1.8231) 
- -.048651 
(-2.3599) 
W5 .025532 
(.62827) 
- -
-
- -
«6 .043692 
(1.2383) 
.086807 
(2.6197) 
.074490 
(2.2422) 
-
- .07236 
(2.1677) 
W7 -.036150 
(-2.5361) 
- -.024437 
(-4.0004) 
- -.015099 
(-2.3029) 
-
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Reschedulings 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Chi-squared 42.3171 16.9729 33.3746 27.9922 32.4813 27.0491 
Degrees of freedom 7 3 3 3 3 4 
means not included. 
^T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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(chi-squared) for model C is significant at 0.5 percent. In model B, all 
2 
of the variables are significant. Also, % for model B is significant at 
.5 percent suggesting that economic ratios (variables) considered in 
model B cause the variation in the probability of default by country i. 
In model B, variables , W^, and Wg are highly significant. They 
can be interpreted as: (the ratio of international reserves to 
imports of goods and services) is significant at one percent and has the 
anticipated negative sign. This means that the higher the ratio of 
international reserves to imports of goods and services, the lower the 
probability of debt rescheduling by debtor country i. (ratio of total 
debt services to exports of goods and services or debt-service ratio) is 
significant at rive percent but again it has the unexpected negative sign 
meaning the higher the debt-service ratio, the lower the probability of 
debt rescheduling by debtor country i. Also, variable Wg (ratio of 
interest payments to exports of goods and services or interest-service 
ratio) is significant at one percent with the correct positive sign. It 
shows the higher the interest-service ratio, the higher the probability 
of debt rescheduling by debtor country i. 
In model D, variable (the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed 
to exports of goods and services) is significant at five percent and has 
the expected positive sign. Therefore, the higher the ratio of debt to 
exports for country i, the higher the probability of default by country 
i. The same story is true with respect to variable (the ratio of debt 
outstanding and disbursed to GNP) in model D, i.e., in model D is 
significant at one percent and has the expected positive sign. So, 
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contributes a lot to the probability of debt rescheduling by debtor 
country i. If the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to GNP is high 
for country i, we expect the probability of debt rescheduling by country 
i to be high. Again, in model D, (the debt-service ratio) is 
significant at five percent and has the unexpected negative sign. Of 
course, x (chi-squared) is significant at .5 percent for model D, 
showing the considered economic ratios (variables) in model D are 
relevant variables which explain the variation in the probability of debt 
rescheduling by country i. 
In model E, variable Wy (the ratio of international reserves to debt 
outstanding and disbursed) is significant at five percent and has the 
expected negative sign suggesting again that the higher the ratio of 
international reserves to debt for country i, the lower the probability 
of debt rescheduling by country i. 
In model F, four variables, , W^, W^, and Wg, are significant, 
which can be interpreted as; (the ratio of international reserves to 
imports of goods and services) is significant at five percent and has the 
expected negative sign, suggesting the higher the ratio of international 
reserves to imports of goods and services, the lower the probability of 
debt rescheduling for country i. Wg (the ratio of debt outstanding and 
disbursed to exports of goods and services) is significant at one percent 
and has the correct positive sign. It means the higher the ratio of debt 
to exports for country i, the higher the probability of debt rescheduling 
for country i. (the debt-service ratio) is significant at five 
percent and again it has the unexpected negative sign. Wg (the ratio of 
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interest payments to exports of goods and services or interest-service 
ratio) is significant at five percent and has the expected positive sign. 
This says, the higher the interest-service ratio for debtor country i, 
2 
the larger the probability of debt rescheduling by debtor country i. % 
(chi-squared) for model F is significant at .5 percent suggesting that 
the considered economic ratios (variables) in model F are relevant 
variables which explain the variation in the probability of debt 
rescheduling by country i. 
In general, by looking more closely at the results of sections 2 and 
3 of this chapter we can summarize the following: among the seven 
economic ratios that we have considered in our study in sections 2 and 3, 
the following economic ratios are significant, i.e., they affect the 
probability of debt rescheduling by country i: 
a) (the ratio of international reserves to imports of goods and 
services) is significant and has the expected negative sign. It 
can be interpreted as: the higher the ratio of international 
reserves to imports of goods and services, the lower the 
probability of debt rescheduling by country i. 
b) Wj (the ratio of international reserves to debt outstanding and 
disbursed) is significant and has the expected negative sign. 
This means the higher the ratio of international reserves to debt 
outstanding and disbursed by country i, the lower the probability 
of default by country i. 
c) Wg (the ratio of interest payments to exports of goods and 
services or interest-service ratio) is significant and has the 
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expected positive sign. This says, the higher the interest-
service ratio for debtor country i, the larger the probability of 
debt rescheduling by country i. 
d) Wg (the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to exports of 
goods and services) is significant and carries the expected 
positive sign. This suggests, the higher the ratio of debt 
outstanding and disbursed to exports of goods and services for 
country i, the larger the probability of debt rescheduling by 
country i. 
e) Wg (the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to GNP) is 
significant and has a positive sign which is expected. There­
fore, the higher the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to 
GNP for country i, the higher the probability of debt 
rescheduling by country i. 
f) (the debt-service ratio) is significant but has the unexpected 
negative sign which suggests, the higher the debt-service ratio 
for country i, the lower the probability of debt rescheduling by 
country i. 
4) As we observed in previous sections, there are key economic 
ratios; (ratio of international reserves to imports of goods and 
services), (ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to exports of 
goods and services), (ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to GNP), 
(ratio of total debt services to exports of goods and services or 
debt-service ratio), Wg (ratio of total debt services to GNP), Wg (ratio 
of interest payments to exports of goods and services or interest service 
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ratio), and Wy (ratio of international reserves to debt outstanding and 
disbursed) which influences the probability of debt rescheduling by the 
debtor countries. These key economic ratios can serve as indicators that 
give information about the economic situation of the borrowing countries 
as well as the variation in the probability of.debt rescheduling by them. 
When international financial institutions and western banks want to grant 
a loan to a borrowing country, they base their decision on the current 
economic information that they have about the borrowing country. But 
economic situation in the borrowing country can change. Therefore, if 
international financial institutions and western banks can get more 
accurate information about the future values of these key economic 
variables (ratios) of the borrowing country, they can use this 
information to adopt and conduct a better and safer loan.policy. One 
way to forecast the future values of these key economic ratios, is to use 
the past data of these economic ratios. So I used the data (historic 
data of these key economic ratios mentioned above) for the years, 1970, 
1974, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 to get the 
forecasted value of the economic ratios: (forecasted value of the 
ratio of international reserves to imports of goods and services), Wg 
(forecasted value of the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to 
exports of goods and services, (forecasted value of the ratio of debt 
outstanding and disbursed to GNP, (forecasted value of the ratio of 
total debt services to exports of goods and services or forecasted value 
of debt-service ratio), (forecasted value of the ratio of total debt 
services to GNP), Wg (forecasted value of the ratio of interest payments 
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to exports of goods and services, and (forecasted value of the ratio 
of international reserves to debt outstanding and disbursed). 
Then, I consider the following probit regression equation: 
ft ' 'O + *l"lt + *2"2t *3*3t * + «5*5t 
+ OgWgt + GyWft + S 
where again t stands for the year under consideration, P is the 
probability of debt rescheduling, and 0 ^  P <_ 1 and X^, Xg, .Xy are 
the forecasted economic ratios (variables) as: 
= Forecasted value of the ratio of international reserves to 
imports of goods and services for the year 1985. 
Wg = Forecasted value of the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed 
to exports of goods and services for the year 1985. 
Wg = Forecasted value of the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed 
to GNP for the year 1985. 
= Forecasted value of the ratio of total debt services to exports 
of goods and services (the forecasted value of debt-service 
ratio) for the year 1985. 
Wg = Forecasted value of the ratio of total debt services to GNP for 
the year 1985. 
Wg = Forecasted value of the ratio of interest payments to exports 
of goods and services for the year 1985. 
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Wy = Forecasted value of the ratio of international reserves to debt 
outstanding and disbursed for the year 1985. 
I have run the above probit regression equation for forecasted 
ratios of 1985. Again the data are taken from various issues of World 
Debt Tables published by the World Bank. The results of this study are 
shown in Table 4.5. 
In model A, there are two significant variables, W^ and Wg. W^ (the 
forecasted debt-service ratio) is significant at five percent and, again, 
here it has the unexpected negative sign. This means if we consider the 
forecasted debt-service ratio for debtor country i, we can expect the 
following: the higher the forecasted debt-service ratio, the lower the 
probability of debt rescheduling by country i, which is, of course, 
against our expectation. Wg (the forecasted ratio of interest payments 
to exports of goods and services) is significant at five percent and has 
the expected positive sign. This means the higher the forecasted ratio 
of interest payments to exports of goods and services, the more we should 
2 
expect a debt rescheduling by country i. x (chi-squared) for model A is 
highly significant (it is significant at .5 percent) and confirms that 
the variation in the probability of debt rescheduling is very well 
explained by the variables W^, W^, ..., W^which are considered in model 
A. 
In model B, only variable Wg is significant at five percent and has 
the correct positive sign. In model B, other variables are not 
significant. Again in model C, only variable Wg is significant at five 
Table 4.5. Estimation of the probit model of debt reschedulings using forecasted economic 
ratios 
Model A B C D E . F 
Wl -.014839 
(.16030)9 
-.061874 
(-.85580) 
_a 
- - -.033176 
(-.43334) 
W2 .0021610 
(.68362) 
- - .00016696 
(-.83149) 
.00035721 
(-.17482) 
.0020305 
(1.0646) 
W3 .011741 
(.61291) 
- - .02433 
(2.3123) 
.026847 
(2.4985) 
-
«4 -.11681 
(-1.7182) 
-.038966 
•(-1.0011) 
-.043563 
(-1.0808) 
-.0066898 
(.33901) 
- -.039715 
(-1.0070) 
W5 .17868 
(1.0804) 
-
-
-
-
-
*6 .17347 
(1.9270) 
.12627 
(1.8395) 
.12758 
(1.8295) 
- - .11589 
(1.6610) 
"7 -.00040132 
(-.047126) 
- -.0051662 
(-.76971) 
-
-.004435 
(.61208) 
-
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Reschedulings 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Chi-squared 16.0598 5.6752 5.52925 10.4088 10.6749 6.92115 
Degrees of freedom 7 3 3 3 3 4 
means not included. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. 
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2 
percent with the expected positive sign, x (chi-squared) for both 
models B and C is significant at ten percent. 
In model D, only variable Wg (the forecasted ratio of debt 
outstanding and disbursed to GNP) is significant at five percent and has 
the expected positive sign. Therefore, the bigger the forecasted ratio 
of debt outstanding and disbursed to GNP, the higher the probability of 
2 debt rescheduling by country i. % (chi-squared) for model D is 
significant at two percent, i.e., the probability of debt rescheduling by 
country i is strongly affected by the variables W^, and W^. 
In model E, only variable is significant and has the expected 
2 
positive sign. Of course, % (chi-squared) is significant at two percent 
for model E. In model F, none of the variables are significant. 
In general (for this part of the study), we can summarize the 
following: there are three forecasted economic ratios which are 
significant and they affect the probability of debt rescheduling by 
country i very strongly. These three forecasted economic ratios are , 
W^, and Wg. (the forecasted ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed 
to GNP) and Wg (the forecasted ratio of interest payments to exports of 
goods and services) have the expected positive signs. (the forecasted 
debt-service ratio) is significant but has the unexpected negative sign. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, I have tried to add some statistical analytics to a 
subject that is being frequently discussed from a rather economic view 
point. The point is (as I mentioned in Chapter I) whether in fact there 
is a relationship between the financial-ratio profile of the 
less-developed debtor countries and their reschedulings of the external 
liabilities. I have examined these relationships (as much as the 
available data allowed me) using probit probability technique. Applying 
this technique, I take economic ratios (like the ratio of debt to GNP, 
etc.) as independent variables and, of course, the dependent variable is 
the rescheduling positions of the debtor countries. After looking at the 
results and examining them I can conclude that economic ratios like the 
ratio of international reserves to imports of goods and services, the 
ratio of interest payments to exports of goods and services or 
interest-service ratio, the ratio of debt outstanding and disbursed to 
exports of goods and services, and the ratio of debt outstanding and 
disbursed to GNP are statistically significant and their coefficients 
have the expected positive signs. This can be interpreted that any 
increase in those ratios is going to increase the probability of 
rescheduling of the debts by debtor countries. Therefore, by looking at 
these financial ratios of a particular debtor country we can obtain some 
information about the creditworthiness of the country. However, economic 
ratios such as: ratio of debt services to GNP, and the ratio of total 
debt services to exports of goods and services or debt-service ratio are 
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statistically significant but their coefficients have negative signs. 
This means, the higher these ratios are, the lower the probability of 
rescheduling by the debtor country is going to be. Of course, this is 
against the expectation. Considering this fact, it is difficult to come 
up with any strong inference about the relationship between the 
creditworthiness of a debtor country and its economic-ratio profile. 
Even though study of this kind can be enlightening, any statement or 
inference about the creditworthiness of a debtor country should be 
supplemented with the information obtained from the economic ratios and 
other socio-political and economic pertaining to the debtor country. 
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